University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Economics Department Working Paper Series

Economics

2005

Can macroeconomic policy stimulate private investment in South
Africa? New insights from aggregate and manufacturing sectorlevel evidence
Léonce Ndikumana

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/econ_workingpaper
Part of the Economics Commons

Recommended Citation
Ndikumana, Léonce, "Can macroeconomic policy stimulate private investment in South Africa? New
insights from aggregate and manufacturing sector-level evidence" (2005). Economics Department
Working Paper Series. 50.
https://doi.org/10.7275/1069123

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Economics Department Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS

Working Paper
Can macroeconomic policy stimulate private
investment in South Africa?
New insights from aggregate and manufacturing
sector-level evidence
by
Léonce Ndikumana

Working Paper 2005-14

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST

Can macroeconomic policy stimulate private investment in South Africa?
New insights from aggregate and manufacturing sector-level evidence

Léonce Ndikumana
Department of Economics
University of Massachusetts
200 Hicks Way
Amherst, MA 01003
ndiku@econs.umass.edu
http://people.umass.edu/ndiku

Abstract
This study explores the determinants of investment using both aggregated industry-level
data and disaggretated data on 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector for the period
1970-2001. According to the results in this study, the government has potentially
powerful means at its disposal to stimulate private investment. In particular, a domestic
demand stimulus and public investment expansion will produce large gains in private
investment. While the direct effects of lowering the interest rate appear to be
quantitatively small, indirect effects operating notably through domestic demand and
cheaper credit are likely to be large. The evidence in this study also indicates that it is
important to minimize exchange rate instability to encourage investment.
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I. Introduction

The South African economy has achieved substantial success in the area of
macroeconomic stabilization in the post post-apartheid era.1 However, stabilization has
not yielded the growth rates that are needed to lift up the living standards of the majority
of the population.

Most importantly, despite remarkable success in the areas of

macroeconomic stabilization, the country still faces difficult challenges arising from the
legacy of marginalization of the majority of the population from the main stream
economy.2 Increasing the living standards of the majority of the population will require
faster overall growth, vigorous employment creation, and stronger and sustained private
investment response to policy reform.

Since the second half of the 1970s, performance in private and public investment has
been disappointing. From 1993 to 2002, total investment as a ratio of GDP increased
only by 1.3% on average in real terms.

This study explores the determinants of

investment with the explicit goal of guiding a discussion of how macroeconomic policies
can be used to induce an “investment transition” in South Africa.3 There are important
empirical and policy reasons for why investment should be at the center of the debate on
how to promote growth and raise employment. The empirical literature has identified
1

A recent IMF Staff Report (IMF 2003) commended the South African authorities for maintaining “strict
fiscal discipline”, managing the currency, and controlling inflation. For a quantitative analysis of
macroeconomic stabilization in South Africa, see Du Plessis (2002, 2004); Du Plessis and Smit (2003).
2
See Gelb (2004) for a review of recent macroeconomic developments.
3
By “investment transition”, we understand sustained substantial increase in the investment/GDP ratio
over several consecutive years. In a cross-country analysis, Rodrik (1999) finds that countries that
experience an investment transition go from a GDP growth rate of 0.8% above world average to 1.4%
above world average (amounting to 2.2% gain in growth). Sub-Saharan African countries in general have
had difficulty sustaining investment growth.
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investment as the most robust determinant of economic growth (Levine and Renelt 1992),
especially equipment investment (De Long and Summers 1991). Both private investment
and public investment are key determinant of cross-country differences in long-run
economic growth (Easterly and Rebelo 1993).

This empirical relationship between

investment and growth has led observers to identify low investment as one of the leading
causes of the slow growth in developing countries in general and in African countries in
particular (Collier and Gunning 1999; Greene and Villanueva 1991).

In addition to its documented contribution to growth, private investment in the case of
South Africa deserves serious attention for three additional reasons. First, sustained
increase in private investment will serve as visible proof of the private sector’s
confidence in public policy both in the sense that policy is heading in the right direction
and that policy reforms are deemed sustainable in the long run. Achieving the growth
rates needed to alleviate poverty and raise employment will require active participation of
private investors. Second, sustained increase in private investment is a sign of efficiency
of public investment especially in reducing the costs of private investment, thus raising
profitability.4 Third, sustained improvement in private investment serves as a catalyst for
attracting foreign direct investment as it is an indicator of high returns to investment and
declining investment risk in the country.

The study explores the determinants of private investment with a special emphasis on the
role of factors that are related to macroeconomic policy. An econometric analysis is
4

See Rienikka and Svensson (2002) for firm-level evidence on the important role of public services for
private investment. The authors find that while firms may attempt to find alternative private sources of
normally publicly supplied services, they do so at the cost of reduced capital accumulation.
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undertaken to attempt to quantify the effects of individual macroeconomic policy
indicators on investment to identify channels of transmission of macroeconomic policy.
The analysis provides quantitative evidence that may shed light on strategies for boosting
private investment as the country seeks ways to raise the trend of GDP growth and
accelerate employment creation.

II. Trends and patterns of aggregate and sector-level investment

Investment in South Africa has exhibited two features: a long-run decline since the mid1970s and high short–run volatility (Figure 1). The country has been unable to sustain
increases in investment, as expansions of investment are followed by contractions. Up to
the mid-1970s, the country maintained a steady upward trend in domestic investment,
peaking at 29.7 percent in 1976. Since then, investment has exhibited a steady decline.
From an average of 26.4 percent of GDP in the 1970s, the investment/GDP ratio declined
to 23 percent in the 1980s and has averaged only 15.6 percent of GDP during the past 10
years of the post-apartheid era.

The rate of capital accumulation has declined in all sectors since the 1970s, although the
decline has been more dramatic in some sectors than in others. In the service sector, the
rate of capital accumulation has declined from about 10 percent in 1970 to less than 1
percent in 2002.

While investment in the manufacturing sector showed some

improvement since the mid-1990s, the recovery was unbalanced. It was mainly driven by
a few subsectors, iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, and basic chemicals (Roberts 2004).
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Agriculture has experienced consecutive years of decline in capital accumulation since
the early 1980s and shows no signs of recovery.

The data indicate that while private investment has exhibited a slow but steady recovery
since the mid-1980s, public investment has declined systematically from since 1976 from
11.5 percent of GDP to a low of 4 percent in 1994 and stood at 5 percent in 2004 (Figure
2). Public investment in South Africa was above the Sub-Saharan average until 1986 but
since then it has declined and dropped below the average for SSA and middle-income
countries (Figure 3).5 Increasing the country’s public investment from its current level of
5 percent of GDP level to at least the modest African average of 7 percent would result in
substantial gains in infrastructure.

The trend of public investment in South Africa casts doubts on some claims in the
empirical literature about the level of public investment and its effects on private
investment. First, the claim that public investment may be “too high” in Africa (Easterly
and Pack 2001) certainly does not apply to South Africa. The decline in GDP growth
experienced since the 1980s cannot be blamed on high public investment since the latter
declined as growth was deteriorating. In contrast, one may argue that the decline in
public investment is partly responsible for poor growth performance. Second, the claim
that allocation of national resources was biased in favor of public investment relative to
private investment is not supported by the data. Mlambo and Nell (2000: 96) argue that
low real interest rates in the 1970s and 1980s redirected capital to the less productive
5

According to the 2004 World Bank classification, South Africa is at the cut off point between upper
middle and lower middle income countries. Comparisons between South Africa’s public investment with
either of the two groups shows a similar pattern.
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parastatals away from more productive private sector. This argument is problematic.
First, lower user cost of capital would redirect capital to the public sector only if there are
quantitative restrictions to access to credit for the private sector that create a “captive
market” for government debt. Second a decline in the cost of capital would reduce
private investment if the returns to capital are declining faster than the costs of capital.
There is no evidence for such a phenomenon either in South Africa or in other African
countries in general, where profit rates are generally high (Gunning and Mengistae 2001;
Bigsten et al 1999). Third, public investment started to decline in the mid-1970s when
real interests were negative and continued to decline even when real interest rates turned
positive and started to increase in the late 1980s. High real interest rates did not redirect
capital into private investment. In contrast, the evidence seems to support the empirical
finding that the long-run level of public investment is an important factor for private
investment. Blejer and Khan (1984) find that while public investment may crowd out
private in the short run, the trend level of public investment has a positive effect on
investment. This suggests that the positive externalities associated with investment in
infrastructure outweigh any short-run costs associated with the potential adverse effects
of public expenditure on the cost of capital. Claims of “crowding out” based on short-run
relationships may therefore be misleading.

III. Major macroeconomic policy regime shifts and their relevance for investment

Monetary Policy

5

Monetary policy orientation in South Africa has experienced a series of changes since the
1960s (for details, see Table A1).6 In the 1960s and for most of the 1970s, the Reserve
Bank used the ratio of liquid assets to deposits as its main tool for controlling financial
intermediation by reducing bank lending in order to control money supply and inflation.
Performance of monetary policy was poor during this period and inflation remained high
and volatile.

In the mid-1980s, following the recommendations by the De Kock

Commission (1985), the Reserve Bank shifted its policy framework to a cost-of-reserves
based system, taking effect in mid-1985.

From 1986 to 1998, the Reserve Bank used monetary aggregates as intermediate targets
with pre-announced growth rates. By the end of the 1990s, it was evident that targeting
monetary aggregates was an ineffective guide for monetary policy. From 1986 to 2000,
the Reserve Bank overshot its pre-announced growth rate of the broad money stock in 9
years out of 15.

In March 1998, the Reserve Bank announced a new system of monetary management,
consisting of daily tenders of liquidity through repurchase transactions, with the explicit
intention of rationing the amount of liquidity in the system. This was the beginning of a
movement towards a “market-oriented” monetary policy system where interest rates are
determined by market forces. The Reserve Bank expressed its desire to reduce inflation
to the levels prevailing among the country’s major trading partners and announced an

6

A non-exhaustive list of useful references on the history and conduct of monetary policy in South Africa
includes. Du Plessis (2002); Du Plessis and Smit (2003); Whittaker (1992); Padayachee (2001); De Wet,
Jonkergouw, and Koekemoer (1995).
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informal inflation targeting framework with a range of 1-5% for the overall CPI index. In
February 2000, the government formally adopted inflation targeting as the principal
objective and focus of monetary polity.7 The rationale of the shift was that inflation
targeting is the best way to achieve price stability because it specifies a precise target
inflation rate and indicates a clear commitment by the monetary policy authority to
achieve the target. According to the SARB, inflation targeting “helps to anchor the
public’s inflation expectations, thereby improving planning for the economy, as well as
providing an anchor for expectations of future inflation to influence price and wage
setting.”8

The Reserve Bank has pursued inflation targeting by keeping interest rates high as a way
of controlling domestic demand. The nominal interest rate has at times risen while
inflation was declining (as in 1993-98), resulting in a sharp increase in real interest rate.
Real interest rates also have increased faster in South Africa than in trading partners,
resulting in higher interest rates differentials (Figure 4). These developments imply that
firms are facing higher costs of credit, which constitutes a constraint to capital
accumulation.

Monetary policy influences private investment directly by affecting the cost of credit.
Therefore, there is an inherent tension between the objectives of achieving low inflation
7

In 2000, the Finance Minister signed a letter to the Reserve Bank Governor constituting an agreement
between the Government and the Reserve Bank on inflation targeting. The letter outlined how the Reserve
Bank ought to handle unforeseen shocks (oil prices, drought, changes in direct taxes, international financial
contagion) that may prevent the Bank from achieving the target, in which case the Reserve Bank will give a
full public explanation.
8
Tito T. Mboweni (Governor of the South African Reserve Bank). “The objectives and importance of
inflation targeting.” Business Day, November 13, 2002.
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and the goal of promoting domestic investment. Monetary policy affects investment
indirectly as well by constraining domestic credit as a means of controlling inflation. In
2000, South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel stated that high domestic credit
extension is an obstacle to economic development and a constraint to monetary policy.
He put is as follows: “Living beyond our means has become part of the national psyche.
It is saddening. We would like to bring down interest rates, but as long as private credit
extension is so high, that counteracts development.”9 The problem with this orientation
of monetary policy is that by constraining credit expansion, contractionary monetary
policy reduces aggregate demand, which constitutes a constraint to investment and output
expansion.

Tight monetary policy associated with high interest rates and a strong

currency also hurt the export sector, undermining international competitiveness.
Achieving low inflation is therefore potentially costly in terms of reduced investment,
employment, and output.

Exchange rate policy

The South African exchange rate regime has undergone five major phases since the
1960s (De Kock Commission 1985; Aron, Elbadawi, and Kahn 2000). The first phase
goes until 1978, where the rand was pegged alternatively to the dollar and the pound.
This period was also characterized by strict controls of the capital account. In 1979,
following the recommendations by the De Kock Commission, the government adopted a
dual exchange rate system to stabilize the capital account while attracting foreign

9

Saturday Star Business Report, 12 August 2000. Cited in South Africa Survey 2000/2001 (by the South
African Institute for Race Relations, Johannesburg), p. 442.
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investment. Under this system, current account and loan transactions were executed at a
market-determined exchange rate, the commercial rand. Equity capital, in turn, was
transacted at a freely floating exchange rate, the financial rand. The reform was intended
to eliminate the disincentives associated with the pre-existing securities rand system,
whereby inflows of investment other than purchases of listed securities were transacted at
the official exchange rate whereas investment outflows were transacted at a lower rate.
In 1983, the dual system was unified under a controlled float system (third phase), but the
dual system was reintroduced in September 1985 and lasted until 1995 (fourth phase). In
March 1995 (fifth phase), the regime was unified again, in the context of a systematic
move toward a market-based exchange rate system.

The past shifts in exchange rate regimes proved inefficient in stabilizing the capital
account and the value of the rand. Under the fixed exchange rate where the Reserve
Bank was effectively controlling the sale and purchase price of currency, the regime
prevented the emergence of an active and competitive foreign exchange market. At the
same time, exchange controls proved inefficient in protecting the official exchange rate
and in deterring capital outflows.

Movements in the exchange rate of the rand have historically been driven by the policy
stance in the area of exchange rate and capital controls and by political developments and
external shocks (especially commodity price shocks). The most noteworthy political
events that had substantial effects on the exchange rate are the 1960 Sharpeville
massacres, the 1976 Soweto riots, and the protracted political unrest beginning in the
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mid-1984. These political shocks were followed by large capital account deficits, largely
due to capital outflows but also due to reduction in capital inflows including debt, which
resulted in depreciation of the exchange.

The effects of the exchange rate on private investment are theoretically ambiguous. Real
exchange rate depreciation increases profitability in export oriented sectors and therefore
promotes investment in these sectors. Conversely, depreciation of the exchange rate
increases the cost of imported capital goods, and thus decreases investment in import
dependent production sectors. The study by Mlambo and Nell (2000) finds that the
appreciation of the rand had a negative effect on investment. Most importantly, the
volatility and unpredictability of the exchange rate increase uncertainty, which
discourages long-term investment in capital stock in favor of short-run speculative
activities. The empirical analysis in this study will explore the effects of exchange rate
instability on investment.

Fiscal policy

The post-independence South African government has gained international reputation for
“strict fiscal discipline,” a label that is rarely attached to a developing country (IMF
2003). The fiscal situation in recent years constitutes a marked departure from past
history of high deficits and politically motivated government spending. Until the mid1990s, the South African government systematically ran high deficits, mainly due to high
(politically motivated) expenditure and weak revenue performance. The fiscal deficit
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exploded especially in the last years of the apartheid regime as the National Party
prepared to exit and engineered a massive increase in public salaries as well as pension
payouts (Gelb 2004: 4). At the end of the apartheid regime, government expenditures
also increased as a result of “social upliftment” initiatives (Cronje 1998).

The budget deficit rose from 3 percent of GDP in 1988 to a record high of 8 percent in
1994 (Figure 5). Government debt increased from 33 percent to 50 percent of GDP
during the same period. Since 1994, the deficit has declined steadily due to both better
revenue performance (from efficiency gains in tax collection as well as an increase in the
tax base) and compression in expenditures.

The main shift in fiscal stance occurred in 1999 as the government sought to achieve
fiscal stability through the reduction of the deficit. The target for the conventional fiscal
deficit was set at 3 percent of GDP.10 The following year the government announced the
adoption of inflation targeting as the overriding goal of monetary policy.

Fiscal policy may affect private investment through five channels. First, under the view
that investment is dependent on saving, fiscal policy influences private investment by
affecting the volume of savings. Tight fiscal policy is supposed to promote private
investment by raising total domestic saving and reducing interest rates. Second, from an
intertemporal view of investment behavior, fiscal policy can also promote investment by
building investors confidence vis-à-vis predictability and credibility of fiscal policy. For

10

Fiscal deficit targeting was initially adopted at the end of 1994. It is coincidentally in 1994 that reserve
bank independence was included in the interim Constitution.
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this channel to operate the government must not only pursue low fiscal deficits, but also
be consistent in pursuing clear and pre-committed goals; that is, the government must
overcome the problem of time inconsistency of fiscal policy. Third, under the view that
investment is demand constrained, fiscal policy influences investment by affecting
domestic demand. Tight fiscal policy through expenditure compression or/and tax hikes
reduces domestic aggregate demand, which negatively affects sales and profits
expectations, thus reducing incentives to invest. Fourth, fiscal policy affects investment
directly through the cost of capital as influenced by tax policy. Finally, fiscal policy
affects investment through public infrastructure investment, which reduces private costs
of production thereby raising profitability.

In light of the above five potential channels of the effects of fiscal policy on investment,
it appears that the recent orientation of fiscal policy in South Africa has pursued the first
two channels (deficit-saving-investment linkages and intertemporal considerations). The
government expected that reducing the deficit and establishing a record of credibility and
consistency in fiscal policy would boost private investment. This has not happened as
investment has continued to be sluggish. This may suggest at least two interpretations.
First, saving may indeed not be the constraint for private investment (Gelb 2004: 14).
Second, the dividends from fiscal policy credibility and consistency may be slow to
materialize.

This would be because the private sector is still unsure about the

sustainability of macroeconomic policy stance in the long run. This may be also due to
perception gaps between what the public believes and what the government actually
accomplishes (Gelb 2002: 32).
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Policy makers have overlooked the third and fourth channel of the linkages between
fiscal policy and investment (through aggregate demand and public infrastructure
investment). In fact, the monetary authority has explicitly pursued policies that contain
domestic demand as a way of controlling inflation as we discussed in the section on
monetary policy earlier.

By containing domestic demand, the authority may have

indirectly contributed to the slow growth of domestic investment. The effects of low
domestic demand on private investment may have exacerbated the effects of the decline
in public investment observed since the 1970s.

IV. New estimates of the impact of macroeconomic policy on investment

Motivation of the empirical model and estimation methodology
The empirical analysis in this study aims at exploring the effects of macroeconomic
policy on private investment for the purpose of examining strategies that may be used to
boost private investment. We adopt a hybrid model that draws from the neoclassical and
Keynesian traditions by emphasizing the role of demand (the accelerator), the cost of
capita, and profitability.

The demand-investment link and macroeconomic policy
The accelerator theory of investment suggests that investment responds to changes in
demand for output (Jorgenson 1971).

Macroeconomic policy can affect private

investment by affecting domestic demand directly. A contractionary monetary policy
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that raises interest rates and/or constrains credit expansion will reduce aggregate demand,
which reduces private investment. Demand is also affected by fiscal policy directly
through government spending and indirectly through transfer programs.

This study explores demand effects by including real GDP growth in the investment
equation. Existing empirical studies on South Africa confirm the important role of
demand for investment (Table 1). Data on the manufacturing sector also provide indirect
evidence on the role of demand.

Insufficient demand account for the bulk of the

underutilization capacity in the sector (Table A3).

One condition for validity of the accelerator is that installed capacity is fully utilized.
When firms have idle capacity, they can meet an increase in demand by raising
production without installing new capital. We control for these effects by including
capacity underutilization in addition to output growth.

However, data on capacity

utilization by sub-sector are only available starting from 1986. The regressions with
capacity underutilization also serve to check the robustness of the results obtained with
the longer sample period.

Cost of capital

Firms invest up to the point where marginal efficiency of capital equals the user cost of
capital. A rise in the user cost reduces optimal capital stock and investment. The basic
measure of capital stock comprises the real interest rate, the effective corporate tax rate,
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the depreciation rate and the ratio of the price of capital goods to the price of output.11
The measure used in this study is the following:

uck it = ( PPI it / p t ).( Rt − π t + δ it ) /(1 − τ t )

eq.1

where PPI is the sector or industry-specific producer price index, p is the GDP deflator, R
is the nominal interest rate, π is the inflation rate, δ is sector or industry-specific
depreciation rate, and τ is the corporate tax rate.12

The user cost of capital is then decomposed into its policy components in order to
quantify the effects of macroeconomic policy on investment through the cost of capital.
Monetary policy affects the cost of capital through the interest rate and inflation. The
data show that since the mid-1990s, nominal interest rates remained high even when
inflation started to decline, which resulted in high interest rates.

Moreover,

misalignments of domestic interest rates relative to international rates resulted in high
interest rate differentials, which tends to reduce incentives for investment in capital stock
while encouraging speculative investment. The study explores these effects by regressing
investment on alternatively the nominal interest rate, the real interest rate and the interest
rate differential. The effects of fiscal policy are tested through the corporate tax rate.

Public investment and government debt
11

A comprehensive measure of the user cost of capital takes into account returns to equity, investment tax
credits, tax liability implications of dividend payouts, tax implications of debt financing, etc. See
Jorgenson and Hall (1967) for details.
12
We do not have data on value added by sub-sector in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, this variable
is not included in the manufacturing sector regressions.
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Public investment affects private investment through two main channels.

The first

channel works though positive externalities of public services and infrastructure that
reduce production and transactions costs, thus raising marginal efficiency of private
capital stock. The second channel operates through demand. An increase in public
investment causes domestic demand and incomes to rise directly and through the
multiplier effects.

Empirical studies on South Africa have shown crowding-in effects of public investment
on private investment. Mlambo and Nell (2000) find that a 10 percent increase in
government expenditure results in a 0.24 percent increase in private investment. Fielding
(1999) estimates the elasticity of private investment with respect to public investment to
be 0.44 for traded capital and 0.36 for non-traded capital.

The ability to use public investment to stimulate private investment is constrained by the
ability of the government to finance public investment without creating excessive
pressure on the budget.

The crowding-in effects of public investment on private

investment may be mitigated by crowding-out effects of deficit financing. We explore
empirically the net impact of these crowding-out and crowding-in effects to assess the
feasibility of a public-investment driven stimulus for private investment.

Labor market factors: costs and skills
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Whether high labor costs cause firms to substitute labor for capital ultimately depends on
the nature of the technology used in the industry. If capital and labor are substitutes, then
we expect a negative correlation between labor costs and investment. There is little
empirical evidence on South African private sector in support for either a positive or
negative effect of labor costs on investment. While Mlambo and Nell (200) find a
negative effect of labor costs on investment the effect is quantitatively very small (an
elasticity of -0.009). Fielding (1997) in contrast finds a positive correlation between
labor costs and investment suggesting substitution between capital and labor.

Labor costs will encourage capital-labor substitution if labor costs are rising faster than
labor productivity. We test for this possibility by including in the empirical model a
measure of the wage-labor productivity gap defined as the difference between the growth
rate of real wages and the growth rate of labor productivity.

The results were

insignificant and are not reported in the paper.

One potential constraint to investment is the shortage of skilled labor. In the context of a
technologically advancing economy, investment expansion requires adequate skills in the
labor market. In South Africa, given the historical legacy of marginalization of the black
population in education, a large fraction of the labor force comprises low-skilled workers.
Unfortunately, it was not possible to test for these effects because do not have reliable
data on skill composition of the labor force by sector.

Data and highlights
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The empirical analysis is based on a panel of aggregate data on the 9 major industries as
well as a panel data on 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector over the period 19702001. The industry-level analysis allows us to make inferences on economy-wide effects
of policy on investment. The analysis at the disaggregated level in turn provides more
degrees of freedom and variability in the regressors, which should improve the quality of
the estimates. Using both levels of aggregation allows us to generalize the results that are
consistent in both sets of data. Analyses using only aggregate data are often criticized for
being too far from the level where the actual investment decision takes place. Analyses
at the micro-level in turn face the challenge of generalizability of the results. We are able
to circumvent the shortcomings of the analysis at either level while taking advantage of
the benefits arising from each level of aggregation. We can be confident that results
which are robust at both levels of aggregation are indeed telling us something about the
true response of private investment to policy innovations.

Although most of the relevant series are available up to 2003, we stop the regression
sample at 2001 because of discontinuities in the unit labor costs series after 2001 that
make the data incomparable before and after 2001. Another truncation of the sample
occurs when we include a measure of capacity utilization for which the information is
available only starting from 1986. Therefore regressions with capacity utilization cover
the 1986-2001 period.

Specification and estimation methodology
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Taking into account the foregoing discussion and the objectives of the study, we
formulate a dynamic empirical investment model that emphasizes the role of demand and
the cost of capital, the latter being a function of policy, controlling for other determinants
of investment. The model is specified as follows:

q

q

q

q

j =1

j =0

j =0

j =0

I it = α 0 + ∑ α j I i ,t − j + ∑ β j Yi ,t − j + ∑ β j uck i ,t − j + ∑ β j X i ,t − j + ν i + ε it

eq.2

where I is the investment-capital stock ratio; Y is the industry or sector output; uck is the
user cost of capital, which is a function of policy variables, namely the interest rate and
the effective corporate tax rate; ν i represents industry- or sector-level fixed effects; ε is
a random error term; q is the number of lags for the regressors (which may vary by
regressor); and X is a vector of other determinants of investment.

Among other

determinants of investment we explore fiscal policy variables (public investment and
domestic government debt), labor market factors (the unit labor costs), indicators of
macroeconomic instability, namely inflation and exchange rate variability,13 capacity
underutilization, and profits. Real profits are obtained by deducting the real wage bill
from real value added: profit it = va it / p t − w it * Lit , where va is real value added, w is

13

A proxy for the variability of the real exchange rate is calculated as the absolute value of the deviation of
the annual value of the real exchange rate from the average of the previous three years. A drawback of this
proxy is that it assumes symmetry of the effects of exchange rate instability on investment (appreciation vs.
depreciation). Regressions with the actual deviation yield an insignificant coefficient.
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real earnings per employee, L is employment. The summary statistics for the regression
variables are given in Tables A2-A3 in the appendix.14

To handle country fixed effects, we can first-difference or mean-difference equation eq.1.
First-differencing yields the following:
q

q

q

q

j =1

j =0

j =0

j =0

∆I it = α 0 + ∑ α j ∆I i ,t − j + ∑ β j ∆Yi ,t − j + ∑ β j ∆uck i ,t − j + ∑ β j ∆X i ,t − j + ∆ε it

eq.3

However, by construction, the first-differenced error term in eq.3 is no longer orthogonal
to the first-differenced regressors, especially the differenced lagged dependent variable,
thus violating an important condition for validity of the OLS estimators. We can apply
the standard instrumental variable approach to address this issue or apply a more general
method where all (first-differenced) regressors are potentially endogenous. The general
method is implemented with the GMM procedure where second and higher lags of the
levels of the endogenous variables and the lagged dependent variable are used as
instruments of the differenced endogenous variables and the differenced lag of the
dependent variable, while differenced exogenous variables serve as their own instruments
(Arrelano and Bond 1991). For the industry-level data, the instrumental-variable fixedeffects regressions produced superior results to GMM regressions. For the manufacturing
sector data, the two-step GMM procedure was applied as the one-step results indicated
the presence of a first-order serial correlation.

Discussion of the empirical results
14

The means are used to compute the elasticities associated with the regression coefficients. In the
regressions on the manufacturing subsector with a measure of capacity underutilization, the variables are in
logs (thus the coefficients are elasticities) except for the growth rate of output and the real interest rate, for
which the elasticities are obtained by multiplying the coefficient and the mean of the regressor.
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The regression results are organized as follows: regressions on industry data are reported
in Table 2. Regressions on manufacturing sub-sectors are in Table 3 and the implied
elasticities are reported in Table 4 (both at the industry level and for the manufacturing
sector). The regressions on the 1986-2001 period that include capacity underutilization
are reported in Tables 5. The discussion will emphasize results related to factors that can
be influenced by policy.

Demand and the accelerator effects
The regression results confirm a significant and robust accelerator effect on investment at
the aggregate/industry level as well as at the manufacturing sector level. If we interpret
industry-level results as economy-wide results, these results suggest that were the country
able to raise its trend GDP growth from its current level of 3 percent to 4.5 percent, this
would induce a one percent increase in investment. Regressions that include real output
rather than its growth rate show a very high demand elasticity of investment, where every
one-rand additional domestic demand induces about 80 cents of new investment (not
reported here but available from the author upon request).

These results suggest that an important strategy for increasing investment is to raise the
level of domestic demand and the trend growth of GDP. The relationship between
demand/growth and investment goes both ways. Raising demand and growth stimulates
investment, but also more investment itself will contribute to more growth. A domestic
demand stimulus is a precondition for investment response to policy reform. Therefore,
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policies that raise income to stimulate private consumption, such as direct government
spending on infrastructure and social transfers will have positive effects on private
investment through the accelerator effects. In the end, expansionary policies will have
beneficial effects on growth through capital accumulation.

The cost of capital: interest rate and corporate tax
Consistent with earlier studies, we find that investment is responsive to the cost of capital
(also see Hirsh 2004). However, the effect of the composite measure of the user cost of
capital is insignificant at the industry level (not reported here) and, while it is significant
at the manufacturing sector level, it is quantitatively small (with an elasticity of -0.085).
We decompose the user cost of capital to isolate the effects of the real interest rate and
the corporate tax rate.

We find that both the real interest rate and the nominal interest rate have a negative and
significant effect on investment both at the economy-wide level and in the manufacturing
sector. However, investment seems to be more responsive to changes in the nominal
interest rate than changes in the real interest rate. The real interest-rate elasticity of
investment is -0.07 at the industry level compared to -0.26 for the nominal interest rate.
The corresponding elasticities in the manufacturing sector regressions are -0.05 and
-0.18, respectively. Note, however, that when we control for capacity underutilization,
which is a richer specification of the accelerator investment model, we obtain a larger
effect of the interest rate. The increase in the coefficient and elasticity is more noticeable
for the real interest rate, tripling from -0.05 to -0.16 while that associated elasticity with
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respect to the nominal interest rate rises from -0.18 to -0.31 (Tables 5). According to the
results in Table 5, if the real interest rate was reduced from, say 10 percent to 8 percent (a
20 percent cut), investment would increase by about 3 percent.

Although the direct positive effects of lowering the interest rates on investment may seem
quantitatively small, there is one important advantage to exploiting this effect to stimulate
investment. The government has at its disposal ready policy tools for cutting the interest
rate to encourage investment without having to wait for other changes in the economy to
occur first. These policy tools are monetary policy to lower the general level of market
interest rates and credit allocation policies to provide favorable rates for sectors of the
economy that are deemed to have strong income and employment multiplier effects.

The results show that a high effective corporate tax rate can deter private investment.
The regressions on the full sample suggest that these effects are likely to be quantitatively
small. Note, however, that the regressions with capacity underutilization on the shorter
sample period yield larger effects, implying that a 10 percent increase in the corporate tax
rate may cause as much as 2 percent contraction in investment (Tables 5). This suggests
that the government faces limitations in its ability to raise revenue by increasing taxes on
businesses. This also implies that there is a need for exploring alternative sources of tax
revenue (other than increasing taxes) that do not have direct adverse effects on the
profitability of capital accumulation.

Public investment and profitability
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Consistent with other studies, this paper finds that higher profitability stimulates private
investment. To the extent that policy can increase firm profits, this would increase
investment.

One way for policy to promote firm profitability is through public

infrastructure investment. Investments in improvement of availability and quality of
transportation services, telecommunication, electricity, etc., will reduce the costs of
production, raise profitability, and stimulate private investment.

According to the regression results, increasing South Africa’s ratio of public investment
to GDP from its current level of 5 percent to, say 6 percent – the average level for uppermiddle income countries, would generate 5.6 percent more investment.15

The results are consistent with firm-level empirical evidence on the role of infrastructure
and public services for investment. For example, using firm data on Uganda, Reinikka
and Svensson (2002) find that the lack and inefficiency of public services constitute an
important deterrent to investment. They find that while firms find alternative private
means of supplying for these services (e.g., private generators of electricity), this is
accomplished at the cost of lower capital accumulation.

Given that public investment appears to be a strong booster for private investment, the
natural question then is how to finance public investment expansion and how the
financing in turn will affect investment. Government could raise revenue or resort to
debt financing, which, according to South African government practice would involve
15

South Africa is right at the cut off point between upper middle income and lower middle-income
countries. Raising South Africa’s public investment to the average for lower middle income countries (7%)
would result in a 11 percent increase in private investment.
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primarily domestic borrowing. According to the results in this study, domestic borrowing
by government has a negative impact on investment. However the results also suggest
that the net impact of an increase in public investment financed by domestic borrowing is
likely to be positive. For example, if the increase in the public investment-GDP ratio
from 5 percent to 6 percent described above was entirely financed by domestic debt, the
crowding-out effect of the associated domestic borrowing would be a 1.7 percent decline
in private investment and the net impact would be a 3.9 percent increase in private
investment.16

The actual net gain from expanding public investment may be lower than these estimates
suggest due to other indirect effects of government borrowing, including higher interest
rate.

We control for these effects in the regressions by adding the interest rate

simultaneously with public investment. High levels of debt may also have negative
overhang effects on private investment. Despite all these possible mitigating effects, the
empirical evidence in this study supports the view that raising public investment
constitutes a potent tool for boosting private investment. The results cast doubt on claims
that public investment may have crowded out private investment. Instead, the results
suggest that the government can stimulate an investment transition by raising its
expenditure on infrastructure. The results further suggest that the prolonged decline in
public investment since the mid-1970s may have contributed to sluggish private
investment.

16

Using the results in Table 5 where public investment and domestic borrowing are entered
simultaneously, the net impact of a debt-financed increase in public investment is a 7.5 percent gain in
private investment. This is not surprising since the extra domestic debt needed to finance the increase in
public investment is an increase from a bigger base than the increase in public investment.
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Macroeconomic uncertainty: inflation and exchange rate variability
The literature on investment in South Africa has emphasized macroeconomic and
political uncertainty as an important deterrent to private investment (Fedderke 2004;
Fielding 1997; Heintz 2000, 2002; Hirsh 2004). The results in this study show that
macroeconomic instability as measured by inflation and exchange rate variability has
negative effects on private investment.

The immediate policy implication of this result is that macroeconomic policy that aims at
maintaining a stable value of the national currency while keeping inflation within
reasonable range will help to promote private investment. The key is to establish and
maintain credibility through prudent macroeconomic policy. In particular, monetary and
exchange rate policy must be predictable by avoiding sudden changes in policy rules.
However, the objective is not to achieve the lowest level of inflation. Such a strategy
would require maintaining high interest rates and large interest rate differentials, which as
demonstrated in the regression results, would hurt private investment.

Moreover,

targeting a very low inflation rate would result in an overvalued currency, which would
discourage investment in export-oriented sectors and sectors that depend on imported
inputs.

The empirical results suggests that the benefits from the current relatively tight
macroeconomic policy regime in terms of low inflation and policy credibility may be
offset by negative effects of high interest rates on private investment. The implication is
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that while the government needs to continue pursuing prudent macroeconomic policy,
there is a need to reevaluate the tightness of policy targets. It is important to explore
whether there is room for reducing the interest rate without running the risk of causing
the inflation to rise out of control. To the extent that the inflation target and outcomes
remain in the single-digit range, and that macroeconomic policy continues to follow clear
and consistent rules, there is good reason to believe that a cut in the interest rate would
stimulate investment without undermining the success achieved during the post-apartheid
era in the areas of stabilization and credibility of macroeconomic policy.

Labor market factors
The industry-level results show no significant effect of the unit cost of labor on
investment. However, the results for the manufacturing sector show a negative effect
(though not robust to alternative specifications) of unit labor costs on investment,
implying some complementarity between labor and capital.

However, as discussed

above, a rise in wages discourages employment in the absence of offsetting labor
productivity growth. According to the data on the manufacturing sector in Table A3, the
wage-labor productivity gap seems to be positively rather than negatively correlated with
employment growth.

It appears that manufacturing subsectors where wages lagged

behind labor productivity are also those which shed employment and vice versa.

Overall, the results in this study are largely inconclusive vis-à-vis the linkages between
labor market conditions and investment. The results certainly do not support the view
that labor costs are an important factor for labor shedding as a result of capital-labor
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substitution. However, the analysis is limited due to data scarcity which did not allow to
incorporate the constraint of skills shortage. This is a serious concern in the context of an
economy that is experiencing simultaneously rapid technological advancement and high
unskilled unemployment. This topic merits serious attention.

V. Conclusion

This study aimed at documenting the role of determinants of private investment that are
directly related to macroeconomic policy using both aggregate data at the industry level
and disaggregated data at the sub-sector level in the manufacturing sector. We highlight
here four main conclusions from the econometric results which are especially relevant for
policy. First, a demand stimulus will have substantial effects on private investment. This
result implies that low domestic demand will continue to be a constraint to investment
expansion. Government policy can exploit this channel to stimulate investment through
strategies that raise public as well as private domestic spending. Second, the results
suggest that relaxing the monetary policy stance will have some positive effects on
private investment. While the direct effects of interest rate cuts may be quantitatively
small, it is still useful to exploit this policy route given that the government has direct
measures to reduce the interest rate. Moreover, indirect effects of lower interest rates
operating notably through higher domestic demand and cheaper credit will amplify the
direct effects in stimulating investment.
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Third, the study finds that higher profitability stimulates investment. One means at the
government’s disposal for exploiting this result for stimulating investment is through
public investment.

Higher investment in public infrastructure such as transport,

telecommunication, and electricity will reduce private costs of production, thus raising
profitability, which will stimulate private investment. The results in this study establish a
strong crowding-in effect of public investment on private investment. Simple simulations
from the regression results indicate that the crowding-in effects of public investment tend
to dominate the crowding-out effects of domestic borrowing by the government. Note
that the government needs to explore other means for financing public investment that do
not involve increasing domestic borrowing. A public-investment led stimulus for private
investment is a fiscally feasible strategy.

Fourth, the results indicate that macroeconomic stability is essential for private
investment.

In particular, price stability and exchange rate stability are important

conditions for private investment expansion. The results suggest that the gains from
prudential macroeconomic policy are substantial. Therefore, the need to stimulate private
investment through relaxation of the macroeconomic stance ought to be balanced with the
need to preserve macroeconomic stability.
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Table 1: Determinants of private investment – Selected empirical evidence
Factor
Sample period, data,
methodology

Fedderke (2004)
1970-97; panel data; 27
manufacturing sectors; panel
data analysis

Demand; capacity;
output

Macroeconomic
uncertainty

Proxy: expected change in
output
Result: positive effect (largest
effect);
Elasticity = +0.75

Political uncertainty

Proxy: weighted average of 11
indicators of repression
Result: negative effect
Elasticity = -0.06

Rate of return (level and
uncertainty of return)

Fielding (1997)
1946-92; aggregate (distinguishing
between traded and nontraded capital);
Time series analysis
Proxy: change in real GDP at factor
cost
Result: positive effect
Elasticity = +0.91 (nontraded); +1.07
(traded)

Proxy: number of strikes
Result: negative effect on traded capital
Elasticity: -0.09 (traded)

Proxy: combination of variability of
returns and cost of capital and industrial
unrest
Result: negative effect on nontraded
capital; positive effect on traded capital
Elasticity = -0.49 (nontraded); +0.35
(traded)
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Mlambo and Nell (2000)
1960-94; aggregate; Time
series analysis

Heintz (2000; 2002)
1970-93; 7 industrial
sectors; panel data analysis

Proxy: change in real
output
Result: positive (small)
effect
Elasticity: 0.0001
Variability of
macroeconomic
environment
Proxy: inflation; terms of
trade, budget deficit; debt
Results: all significant

Proxy: sector value added
Result: positive effect
Elasticity: +0.014

Proxy: combination of
prison population,
detentions, strikes
Result: negative effect (=
factor effect)
Elasticity: -0.027
Proxy: profit rate
Result: positive effect
Elasticity: +0.027

Table 1 (Cont’d)
Factor
User cost;
interest rate

Fedderke (2004)
Proxy: real interest rate + depreciation
rate + corporate tax rate
Result: negative but insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Labor costs;
wages

Proxy: real wage
Result: insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Government
investment

Proxy: public investment
Result: crowding-in
Elasticity = 0.04

Finance and
credit

Proxy: change in operating profits
Result: insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Trade
liberalization;
Exchange rate

Proxy = (exports+imports)/value
added
Result: insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Fiscal policy

Fielding (1997)
Proxy: real interest rate
Result: negative effect
Elasticity = -1.36
(nontraded); -1.14
(traded)
Proxy: aggregate real wage
bill
Result: positive (nontraded)
Elasticity = +2.50
Proxy: public investment
Result: positive effect
Elasticity = +0.44
(nontraded); +0.36
(traded)
Proxy: credit to the private
sector
Result: insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Mlambo and Nell (2000)
Proxy: real interest rate
Result: negative effect
Elasticity = 0.008

Heintz (2000; 2002)
Proxy: real interest rate +
depreciation + tax rate
Result: negative but
insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Proxy: unit labor cost
Result: negative effect
Elasticity: -0.009
Proxy: public investment
Result: positive effect
Elasticity: +0.37

Proxy: public investment
Result: positive but
insignificant
Elasticity = 0

Proxy: domestic credit
Result: positive effect
Elasticity: +0.0003
Proxy: real exchange rate
Result: negative effect
Elasticity: -0.0001

Proxy: (1 – effective tax on
capital income = 1 − τ )
Result: negative (nontraded
capital)
Elasticity = +2.28

Proxy: budget deficit
Result: negative effect of bondfinanced deficit (no effect of moneyfinanced deficit)
Elasticity: -0.067

Source: Fedderke, J.W., 2004. “Investment in fixed capital stock: Testing the impact of sectoral and systemic uncertainty.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 66 (2),
165-187; Fielding, D., 1997. “Aggregate investment in South Africa: A model with implications for political freedom.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 59
(3), 349-369; Heintz, James, 2000. “Political unrest, distributive conflict, and investment: the case of South Africa.” Paper presented at the PERI workshop on
Investment in Africa, October 2000. Heintz, James, 2002. “Political conflict and the social structure of accumulation: The case of South African apartheid.” Review of
Radical Political Economics, 34 (3), 319-326; Mlambo, K. and Kevin Nell, 2000. “Public policy and private investment in South Africa: An empirical investigation.” In
Elbadawi, I. and T. Hartzenberg (Eds.). Development Issues in South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 80-109.
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Table 2: Industry regression results – effects of monetary and fiscal policy factors
(instrumental-variable two-way fixed effects estimates)

Lagged
investment
Output
growth
Lagged
output
growth
Profit
Real unit
labor costs
(change)
Corporate
tax rate
(change)
Real interest
rate
Nominal
interest rate
Inflation
Interest rate
differential
Public
investment
Government
domestic
debt
Exchange
rate
variability
R-sq within
R-sq
between
R-sq overall
F-test for
fixed effects

Government
Public
Short-term
investment/GDP domestic
interest
debt/GDP
differential
with U.S.
(5)
(4)
(3)
0.526
0.526
0.526
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.039
0.039
0.039
(0.06)
(0.06)
(0.06)
0.046
0.046
0.046
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)

Exchange
rate
variability

Real
interest
rate

Nominal
interest
rate

(1)
0.526
(0.00)
0.039
(0.06)
0.046
(0.02)

(2)
0.526
(0.00)
0.039
(0.06)
0.046
(0.02)

0.0003
(0.01)
0.015
(0.64)

0.0003
(0.01)
0.016
(0.64)

0.0003
(0.01)
0.015
(0.64)

0.0003
(0.01)
0.015
(0.64)

0.0003
(0.01)
0.015
(0.64)

0.0003
(0.01)
0.015
(0.64)

-0.100
(0.00)

-0.425
(0.00)

-0.021
(0.80)

-0.049
(0.69)

-0.370
(0.00)

0.058
(0.56)

-0.056
(0.25)
-0.157
(0.00)

-0.203
(0.04)
-0.307
(0.00)

(6)
0.526
(0.00)
0.039
(0.00)
0.046
(0.00)

-0.170
(0.00)
-0.175
(0.00)
-0.262
(0.00)
-0.203
(0.00)
0.415
(0.01)
-0.099
(0.04)
-0.198
(0.00)
0.85
0.99

0.85
0.99

0.85
0.99

0.85
0.98

0.85
0.99

0.85
0.99

0.86
7.05
(0.00)

0.86
7.05
(0.00)

0.86
7.05
(0.00)

0.86
7.05
(0.00)

0.86
7.05
(0.00)

0.86
7.05

- Sample: 9 industries, 1972-2001, N=256 observations.
- The dependent variable is gross investment as a percentage of capital stock. The
numbers in parentheses are the p-values.
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Table 3: Manufacturing sector results – monetary and fiscal policy factors
(GMM two-step results)
Cost of
capital

Lagged
investment
Output growth
Lagged output
growth
Real unit labor
costs
Cost of capital

(1)
.547
(0.00)
.034
(0.00)
.033
(0.00)
-.052
(0.00)
-0.048
(0.07)

Public
Policy
Real
interest components investment
of cost of
rate
capital
(4)
(3)
(2)
0.577
.608
.633
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
0.030
.025
.033
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.00)
0.016
.029
.033
(0.04)
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.039 -.036
-.018
(0.09)
(0.12)
(0.43)

Real interest
rate
Nominal
lending rate
Inflation

-0.190
(0.03)

Corporate tax
rate (change)
Public
investment
Government
domestic debt
Exchange rate
variability

-0.046
(0.66)

-.186
(0.08)
-.273
(0.02)
-.215
(0.03)

-.274
(0.02)
-.159
(0.28)
-.283
(0.00)

Government Exchange
rate
domestic
variability
debt/GDP
(6)

(5)
.561
(0.00)
.037
(0.00)
.047
(0.00)
-.034
(0.18)

0.513
(0.00)
0.043
(0.00)
0.041
(0.00)
-0.033
(0.06)

-.139
(0.26)
-.324
(0.03)
-.324
(0.01)

.886
(0.02)
-.229
(0.04)
-0.065
(0.00)

First-order
-3.30
-3.13
-3.40
-3.44
autocorrelation (0.001) (0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Second-order
-1.27
-1.23
-1.19
-1.13
autocorrelation (0.20)
(0.22)
(0.23)
(0.25)
Sample: 27 sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector; N=756
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-3.29
(0.00)
-1.21
(0.23)

-3.20
(0.00)
-1.34
(0.18)

Table 4: Estimated elasticities
variable

Output(sum)
User cost of
capital
Profit
Unit labor costs
(growth rate)
Real interest
rate
Nominal
interest rate
Inflation
Corporate tax
rate (change)
Short-term
interest rate
differential
Exchange rate
variability
Public
investment/GDP
Government
borrowing

9 major industries
Table
coefficient elasticity
(eq.)
2 (1)
0.085
0.019
Nr
0
0

27 manufacturing subsector
Table
coefficient elasticity
(eq.)
3 (3)
0.054
0.01
3 (1)
-0.048
-0.085

2 (1)
2 (1)

0.0003
0

0.02
0

na
3 (1)

na
-0.052

na
-0.35

2 (1)

-0.17

-0.067

3 (2)

-0.19

-0.049

2 (2)

-0.175

-0.264

3 (3)

-0.186

-0.178

2 (2)
2 (1-5)

-0.293
0 to 0.003
-0.015

3 (3)
3 (2-55)

2 (3)

-0.262
0 to 0.425
-0.203

-0.273
0 to 0.324
0

-0.19
0 to 0.001
0

3 (6)

-0.198

-0.182

3 (6)

-0.065

-0.044

2 (4)

0.415

0.282

3 (4)

0.886

0.387

2 (5)

-0.099

-0.350

3 (5)

-0.229

-0.552

Note: a value of 0 means that the partial effect or the elasticity is not statistically
significant at the 10% level.
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Table 5: Manufacturing sector – investment regressions with capacity
underutilization, 1986-2001. (GMM two-step regressions)
III (with public IV (public
II (with
I (with real
investment)
investment and
nominal
interest
debt)
interest rate)
rate)
Lag investment
0.498
0.399
0.488
0.455
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Output growth
0.004
0.005
0.002
0.0003
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.77)
Lag output growth
0.003
(0.06)
Capacity
-0.200
-0.240
-0.236
-0.285
underutilization
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Corporate tax
-0.251
-0.216
(0.00)
(0.01)
Real interest rate
-0.024
-0.022
(0.00)
(0.00)
Nominal interest
-0.306
rate
(0.00)
Inflation
-0.051
(0.00)
Public investment
0.203
0.508
(0.02)
(0.00)
Domestic debt
-0.818
(0.00)
First-order
-3.63
-3.27
-3.65
-3.82
autocorrelation
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Second-order
-0.61
-0.86
-0.87
-0.95
autocorrelation
(0.54)
(0.39)
(0.38)
(0.34)
Number of observations = 341 (except in column IV where N=366).
Note: All variables are in logarithm except for output growth, the real interest rate, and
inflation. For variables in logs, the coefficients are the associated elasticities of
investment. The real interest rate elasticity of investment can be computed by
multiplying the coefficient on the real interest rate and the average real interest rate over
the regression period (=6.74), which yields -0.16 and -0.17 in equations I and III,
respectively.
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Table A1: Monetary policy regimes in South Africa, 1960-todate
Period
1960-1980

Monetary regime
Liquid asset/Deposits ratio-based
system with
quantitative controls over
interest rates and credit

Main features of monetary policy and context
- Main focus is on liquid assets/deposits requirements. Rationale: limited supply of and yields
on liquid assets contain bank lending and thus money supply; minor role of the interest rate.
- Starting from 1973, the SARB begins setting accommodation rates above money market rates,
which raises interest rates; Direct limits on bank credit cause disintermediation

1981-1985

Mixed system during transition

1986 to
February 1998

Cost of cash reserves-based
system with pre-announced
monetary targets (M3)

March 1998 to
January 2000

Repo system: daily tenders
of liquidity through
repurchase transactions +
pre-announced M3 targets
+ informal targets of core
inflation (1-5% range)

- Gradual change from liquid assets/deposits ratio-based system to cost of reserves system
(in effect in Mid-1985)
Gradual removal of credit ceilings
- Reforms recommended by the De Kock Commission.
- 1979-80 oil price hikes, low interest rates, and high money growth contribute to “overheated economy”.
- Reforms following recommendations by the De Kock Commission; Also new Bank Governor
(Dr. Chris Stals) more “conservative” (in the sense of inflation aversion)
- The Reserve Bank announces annually the targeted growth rate for M3, from 1986 to 1998.
- Targets are to be achieved by changing the interest rate; short term rate is the main monetary
policy instrument
- The ‘Bank rate’ is used to control demand for bank credit; indirect monetary policy control through
the control of money demand.
- Breakdown of the money growth,-output growth relationship, partly due to financial liberalization
and various structural changes; Result: consistent overshooting of the M3 growth target
(target hit only 5 out of 15 years from 1986 to 2000).
- March 1998: a new system of monetary accommodation is announced (the repurchase system)
- Objective of rationing the amount of liquidity in the financial system.
- The Reserve Bank announced its desire to reduce inflation to levels prevailing among major trading partners
- Informal targeting of overall inflation rate in the 1-5% range
- Greater transparency and credibility become part of the main objectives of the monetary policy orientation

February 2000
– to date

Explicit inflation targeting
with a range of 3-6% for the
CPIX

- February 2000: The Reserve Bank declares inflation targeting as the primary focus of monetary policy.
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Table A2: Summary statistics (9 industries; 27 manufacturing sub-sectors) (19722001)
9 industries
obs
Investment/capital stock (%)
Real gdp growth (%)
Cost of capital
Real labor cost (growth rate, %)
Employment growth (%)
Wage-productivity gap (growth differential,
%) 1972-2001
Wage-productivity gap (growth differential,
%) 1986-2001
Aggregate indicators
Lending rate (%)
Real lending rate (%)
Inflation (%)
Corporate tax (%)
Real short-term interest differential (%)
Real long-term interest differential (%)
Real exchange rate variability (%)
Public investment/GDP (%)
Government domestic borrowing/GDP (%)

mean

270 10.55
270 2.41
270 16.36
265 4.25
265 0.05
265 0.16
139

40

std.
dev.
5.06
6.21
8.05
4.35
4.87
6.97

-0.56

6.19

15.61
4.21
11.41
13.94
-0.67
-1.14
11.12
7.19
37.22

4.20
5.34
3.58
3.14
4.94
3.97
8.20
2.54
6.29

27 manufacturing subsectors
obs
mean
std. dev.
810
810
810
810
810
810

16.31
2.48
23.62
4.58
0.34
0.08

10.59
11.92
8.11
7.93
6.27
11.41

405

-1.46

11.20

Table A3: Summary statistics - manufacturing sub-sector (averages 1986-2001)
Sub-sector

Basic chemicals
Beverages
Basic iron
metals
Electrical
machinery
Fabricated metal
Food products
Furniture
Foot wear
Scientific
instruments
Leather
Machinery
Glass
Motor vehicle &
parts
Non-ferrous
metals
Other chemicals
Tobacco
products
Non-metal
minerals
Paper & paper
products
Coke and
petroleum
products
Plastic products
Printing &
publishing
Television, radio
equipment
Rubber products
Other transport
equipment
Textile products
Apparel
Wood products

Investment
/capital
stock
ratio
(%)
11.1
14.6
10.7

Output
growth
(%)

underutilization
due to
insufficient
demand (%)

Wage –
productivity
gap (%)*

Employment
growth
(%)

2.0
2.0
3.1

Total
capacity
underutilization
(%)
17.3
25.4
13.5

65.5
64.7
73.2

-2.2
-0.4
-5.7

-0.4
-2.0
-5.0

12.7

0.0

23.1

73.2

0.5

1.2

17.3
12.8
16.9
12.7
17.7

0.1
1.0
2.5
-1.5
2.0

22.6
20.0
20.6
14.9
17.8

74.8
55.5
72.4
75.3
78.1

-1.2
-0.3
-0.4
-3.7
-0.6

-1.6
-1.2
1.1
-5.4
-0.9

19.8
12.2
13.0
18.3

0.6
-1.1
1.6
3.4

14.7
25.0
12.3
25.4

58.8
75.4
72.1
64.6

-1.9
-3.2
0.4
-4.5

-0.6
-1.6
-1.6
-0.4

20.1

8.2

10.8

57.5

-8.9

-4.0

9.1
15.3

1.2
-3.1

22.0
16.9

73.4
65.2

-0.6
-0.6

-0.9
-0.9

7.8

0.1

22.7

82.5

-1.5

-4.4

17.4

2.4

12.2

66.6

0.7

0.1

6.5

-1.2

12.5

68.5

-0.6

-0.9

23.4
17.1

5.9
1.8

22.1
16.6

78.1
76.5

0.7
2.7

3.9
1.9

18.6

3.6

24.4

87.8

-0.6

-0.9

15.2
8.8

0.6
-3.0

18.5
30.1

62.3
82.8

-4.4
-2.5

-2.2
-3.1

16.0
17.3
11.8

-1.6
1.1
1.2

19.3
13.3
14.3

69.4
62.3
63.6

-2.3
0.0
1.4

-3.6
-0.3
1.9

Source: author’s computation from TIPS and SARB data.
* wage-productivity gap = growth rate of real wages – growth rate of labor productivity.
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Figure 1: Total investment (% of GDP)
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Figure 2: Gross capital formation, public and private (% of GDP)
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Figure 3: Public investment: South Africa vs. other developing countries

18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
1970

1975
lower-middle income

1980

1985

upper middle income

source: Global Development Network database

43

1990
South Africa

1995

2000
SSA (n=26)

Figure 4: Short term real interest rate differential betw een South Africa and
the USA and the UK
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Figure 5: Government expenditure, revenue, and debt (% of GDP)
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